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Force XXI has proven to be an ambitious and farsighted Army vision of future warfighting and a tribute to
nowretired Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan. Because it is an institutional attempt at US Army reform,
however, the changes being promoted are at times more evolutionary than revolutionary. Force XXI
organizations-at brigade, division, and ultimately corps levels-will represent a synthesis of conventional military
hardware with integrated digital communications. This experimental force will exist within and dominate the
battlefield defined by the range of human senses; it is essentially the force and the concept of the battlefield with
which the United States defeated Iraq in 1991.
This article argues that the traditional perception of the battlefield reveals the limiting assumptions upon which
Force XXI is built, that it is constrained by its three dimensions, and that it is most likely outmoded.
Paradoxically, it is the rise of nonWestern warfare and the proliferation of advanced weaponry that together have
made current "spatial concepts" of the modern battlefield obsolete.[1] To be an effective military force into the
21st century, the US Army should start now to redefine the battlefield so that new operational concepts can
evolve and produce the doctrine and materiel requirements that will lead to meaningful restructuring of all
components of the land force. Without a new conceptual model, Force XXI will fail to take full advantage of the
potential inherent in new and emerging technology, no matter how successful it is in developing technology
appliqués for its existing fleets of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery systems, and aircraft.
Modern Battlespace
The Army's Field Manual (FM) 1005, Operations (June 1993), defines the modern battlefield, or battlespace as
it is called, as follows:
Battle space is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and
engage the enemy.[2]
Components [are] determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire and dominate the
enemy; [it] includes areas beyond the AO [area of operations]; it varies over time according to how
the commander positions his assets.[3]
The above passages share a common liability: they ignore the electromagnetic spectrum.[4] Department of the
Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 5255, Force XXI Operations, a visionary document published in 1994 by the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), better defines battlespace:
Components of this space are determined by the maximum capabilities of friendly and enemy forces
to acquire and dominate each other by fires and maneuver and in the electromagnetic spectrum.[5]
Current Army thought holds that battlespace is composed of separate, discrete physical and electromagnetic
dimensions, each of which must be controlled if friendly operations are to be successful. Recent naval doctrinal
publications share that perception.[6] Military forces are said to operate in the physical dimension, which
represents the world in which humans and their machines move and fight. The boundaries of this specific
"threedimensional battlespace" are, for the purposes of this article, defined by the limitations of humansensing
capabilities. Conversely, information warfare is said to be conducted within the electromagnetic realm where
there are no physical military forces.[7]
The Army's outmoded definition of battlespace has proven adequate for maneuver warfare in the
threedimensional physical battlespace. Armored spearheads and amphibious thrusts seek to defeat opposing
forces by exploiting weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Maneuver warfare with its encirclements, flanking
operations, and disruption of the enemy's command and control processes works well within the constraints of a
physical dimension where military forces and the human senses operate. It has, in fact, come to represent the
dominant Western mode of warfare.
The concept of extended battlespace developed in Force XXI operations enlarges this concept of the physical
threedimensional battlefield with an increase in depth, breadth, and height, but in no way fundamentally alters it.
In fact, the attribute of extended battlespace that comes closest to challenging the linear assumptions that
underpin current doctrine is the concept of the "empty battlefield." This concept, loosely described as the
dispersal of forces for survival purposes, is significant because it most clearly depicts the breakdown of some of
the fundamental assumptions-and hence principles-of warfare dominated for several centuries by Western
philosophies.[8]
Future Battlespace
The reason for this breakdown of our Western mode of warfare is twofold. First, nontraditional adversaries and
forms of conflict have evolved in the recent past that challenge the assumptions that underpin maneuver warfare.
Various "grayarea phenomena," including terrorists, narcocartels, and forces based on clan and ethnic affiliations
bring to conflict characteristics that are asymmetrical to conventional Western forms of warfare.[9] And since
safety for such forces may be achieved by staying off of the conventional battlefield, they have no option but to
leave the threedimensional battlespace acknowledged in US doctrine and disappear in accord with the maxim "if
you can't see a force you can't kill it."
Examples of this form of disappearance include the use of underground tunnel networks at Cu Chi and the
integration of the Vietcong among the populace in Vietnam, the civilian clothing of a terrorist, and the blending of
snipers into unarmed Somali mobs. Since these forces have left the humansensing dimension in which maneuver
warfare dominates, maneuverbased doctrine is insufficient when applied against them.
Second, the breakdown in maneuver warfare can also be seen in the advent of advanced target detection and
precision guided munitions.[10] Any military force, even those fielded by the West, which exists within the
dimension of the human senses can now be acquired and killed. Since maneuver warfare doctrine was based on
a synthesis of decadesold technology and ideas, it is not surprising that the advanced technologies now emerging
negate the presumed benefits that justified this earlier synthesis. The only solution to this dilemma again requires
leaving the humansensing dimension and disappearing-or seeming to do so. The stealth fighter and the submarine
both rely on this tactic as their primary form of defense.
Stealth capability has not yet been an applicable technical option for landbased and amphibious forces, so
tactical and operational innovations have been developed by way of compensation. This has resulted in Western
military forces increasingly turning their attention toward the development of advanced maneuver warfare
concepts. Nonlinear operational concepts based on the absence of front lines or any recognizable rear area have
been developing in Russia for a number of years and are extensively described in various publications.[11]
Similar concepts existed in the midtolate 1980s in TRADOC's Army 21 Interim Operational Concept, with its
references to islands of conflict and deliberate noncontiguity on the battlefield.[12]
The value of stealth capability has, however, been recognized; it was given a priority one requirement in the May
1994 ARPA Report of the Senior Working Group on Military Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Termed
"Invisible Soldier Image Avoidance and Signature Reduction," it called for a capability that would "make the
individual soldier invisible, day or night, to the whole range of battlefield sensors across the electromagnetic
spectrum."[13] As one outcome of this recognized need we may expect the United States to develop and use
either active or metamorphic camouflage systems for defensive purposes.
Advanced Battlespace Concepts
As noted earlier, the implementation of Force XXI will likely be severely compromised unless an advanced
definition of battlespace is created to support it. I propose that it should be based upon two spatial concepts--
humanspace and cyberspace--and two spatial transcendents--stealth and data fusion (see Figure 1).[14]
Humanspace represents the traditional physical dimension of the human senses within which military forces
operate. This spatial concept has already been defined in Force XXI Operations, omitting the electromagnetic
aspect. Cyberspace, on the other hand, represents not only the electromagnetic spectrum, but also that
dimension in which military forces seek refuge for defensive purposes. Forces that enter this dimension are
removed from the humansensingbased battlefield and are thus invulnerable to attack; at the same time, they retain
the capacity to attack military forces that exist in humanspace. Any military force that has the capability of
entering this nonhumansensing dimension, be it Western or nonWestern, must now be considered, respectively,
either a highly advanced asset or a direct threat. Since emerging forms of nonWestern warfare and advanced
technology applications appear to possess many of the same operational characteristics, this is not an
unreasonable characterization.[15]
As an outcome of the development of the concepts of humanspace and cyberspace, a more precise definition of
battlespace dominance in the 21st century may also be required. Cyberspace may be considered dominant over
humanspace. For this reason, the goal of the Army in future war, beyond that of securing assigned politicomilitary
objectives, will be that of total cyberspace dominance-not just digital battlespace dominance.[16] Army forces
may ultimately look toward cyberspace as a place of refuge from attack while denying that refuge and capability
to opposing forces.
The means of entering this refuge will be based upon the application of stealth technology and processes.[17] In
hindsight, it can be said that when Mao Zedong referred to guerrillas as fish in a sea of surrounding population he
was inadvertently stating early principles of what we would now term stealth and cyberspace.[18] Advanced
weaponry, beyond that of the submarine, bomber (B2), and fighter (F117), is now being configured for the very
purpose of exploiting the recognized defensive potential stealth offers. Followon programs to the 21st Century
Land Warrior project seek to incorporate chameleonlike camouflage composed of biomaterials into the modular
Soldier Integrated Protection Ensemble (SIPE) system.[19] Cruise missile successors to the canceled
AGM137A TriService Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM), as well as the recently unveiled Army RAH66
Comanche scout/light attack helicopter, are also now stealthbased.
The counter to stealthmasked forces will be based upon the spatial transcendent of data fusion.[20] Just as
stealth allows a military force to leave humanspace and enter cyberspace, data fusion will negate the protection
stealth provides. Data fusion describes the concept of using information gathered across the electromagnetic
spectrum to locate stealthmasked military forces in space and time.[21] In future operations, opposing forces that
appear invisible to conventional means of detection and identification will be identifiable via superior data fusion
systems and procedures so that they can be immediately neutralized or destroyed. The urgency here
acknowledges that each of the opposing forces will be operating within its own data acquisition and
informationprocessing cycles.[22] Differences in response times measured in seconds will separate the quick and
the dead.
Based upon this tension between stealth and data fusion, the "humansensing dimensional barrier" separating
humanspace and cyberspace will represent a dynamic and contested frontier, a transdimensional forward edge of
the battle area (FEBA) between opposing forces.[23] As a result, new spatial premises of offense and defense
may develop based on two basic formulas. Whenever individuals, organizations, and materiel can avoid or
counter efforts at data fusion, those entities can be said to be operating in cyberspace. Conversely, when efforts
to counter data fusion fail, the entities will be considered to be operating within humanspace, vulnerable to
attacks by an adversary, whether a stealthy cruise missile or a sniper heretofore concealed in the midst of a
crowd. The two concepts can be expressed as follows:
These spatial premises of advanced battlespace can be viewed in Figure 2, which portrays a threedimensional
volume of battlespace bisected by a humansensing fourth dimensional barrier. (Were time to be included in this
concept of battlespace, it would represent a fifth dimensional attribute.) The figure is misleading-humanspace and
cyberspace actually coexist in a given volume of battlespace-but it will have to suffice until conventions for
expressing these concepts have become commonplace. Because stealth masked forces are inherently "invisible"
to normal military forces, they can maneuver with relative impunity in cyberspace. Hence, the "battlefield"
addressed in this essay, and portrayed crudely in Figure 2, appears to have twice the potential volume of the
battlespace currently defined in FM 1005 and being applied to develop Force XXI theory.
Army forces will rely upon the "maneuver force protection" envisioned in Force XXI Operations to extend their
ability to conduct operations.[24] Within a few decades, however, nonstealthmasked Army forces will have
become highly vulnerable-even with the development of high technology proactive armor and point defense
systems.[25] For this reason, the initial digitalization of Army mechanized and armor forces which rely upon
maneuver as the basis of their operational art, while a bold move, can still only be viewed as an incremental step
into future warfare.
This redefinition of battlespace suggests that our traditional concepts of maneuver warfare may be made obsolete
because forces that conduct maneuver warfare operate in humanspace, and humanspace represents the killing
ground of future war. One can only speculate when-or if-this style of warfighting might be replaced by dispersed
land forces engaging in cybermaneuver as a complement to precisionstrike operations conducted by
stealthcloaked missiles and aircraft.[26]
Cybermaneuver Concepts
With this redefinition of the battlefield based upon principles of dualdimensional space, early concepts of
cybermaneuver may now find their way into future editions of Force XXI Operations. The potential need for the
development of such a new form of doctrine was recognized in 1992 by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in a
RAND paper entitled Cyberwar is Coming![27]
For an example of what cybermaneuver warfare may look like, consider two opposing helicopters in a meeting
engagement. Initially, each helicopter will rely upon stealth technologies to keep itself off the other's battlefield.
Both will be using data fusion and informationcycle processing technologies in an effort to acquire, identify, and
engage the other. One belligerent will momentarily gain the initiative by using data fusion to force the other out of
cyberspace and into humanspace. Finally, the "uncloaked" helicopter will be engaged by the other, whose intent
will be to neutralize or destroy it before it can take offensive action itself or escape back into a "cyberspace"
mode of operation by using countermeasures to defeat data fusion activities. Early, primitive applications of this
concept include the firing of flares by aircraft to confuse heatseeking missiles, or technology applied to
helicopters to mask their infrared signature for the same purpose.
Similar concepts of battlespace underlay the functional basis of countersniper systems. Snipers, it can be argued,
use cyberspace as their principle form of defense. They deftly stalk their intended targets by using disciplined
body motions and breathing control to reach a suitable firing position without detection. After neutralizing their
intended target, they fade back into cyberspace and either vanish forever or wait minutes, maybe hours, before
momentarily letting their presence again be known with another kill. The danger of snipers for Army forces
deployed overseas is growing in proportion to increasing urbanization.[28] That insurgents operating in these
environments are likely to be dispersed among innocent noncombatants and have access to precisionguided
munitions (PGMs) is a more ominous concern.[29]
To deal with the sniper threat, a new defensive system called Lifeguard has been developed at the US Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories. Based on stateoftheart commercial technologies, it can locate the point of
origin of a bullet in flight within hundredths of a second. While Lifeguard is unable to return fire, a combat version
with this capability, known as Deadeye, is under development.[30] In essence, this countersniper system, like the
helicopter used in the first example, takes a cyberspacebased force, in this instance a sniper, and strips it of its
invulnerability to attack by bringing it into humanspace by means of data fusion. A sniper faced with this new
technology has a range of choices, none of which is particularly appealing: decline to fire his weapon, target the
countersniper system initially in hopes of disabling it (first the sniper must locate it, of course), or be equipped
with innovative means for circumventing such technology.
These two examples bring up the most significant challenge that will probably face forces operating in
cyberspace. Whenever they actively acquire an adversary in cyberspace, thereby moving it into humanspace,
even if only for a few seconds, they will likely betray their own position in space and time. At that point, both the
attacker and the intended victim can be engaged directly by other killing forces, be engaged by other allied forces
via shared informational awareness, or launch strikes against opposing forces in humanspace. This window of
vulnerability will likely be one of the primary features of the sort of information dominance that must be readily
available to Force XXI and denied to opposition forces.[31]
As a result of technology evolution, future Army commanders may view the battlefield by means of realtime
holographic displays. All friendly forces can be made to appear on these displays; technically sophisticated
opposition forces will appear and disappear from these displays as they are acquired and escape detection,
literally "popping" out of and back into cyberspace. Forces in such a scenario would probably become quickly
intermingled, resulting in a blurring of our traditional concepts of front lines and the tactical, operational, and
strategic continuum.[32] In fact, older military forces and those forces of less advanced national and nonnational
entities which exist and function in humanspace can expect to be engaged simultaneously across the physical
continuum by precision fires in the opening stages of a conflict.[33] The concept of safe rear areas would
conceivably no longer exist because the entire humansensing dimension would indeed become the battlefield.
Within this context, safety would be gained only by means of the "cyberspace shifting" of forces and other
national security assets outside the boundaries of traditional humanspace.
Such a perspective on the future battlefield reinforces the need for digital interoperability standards, the seamless
tracking and engagement of enemy targets, and a future Army force structure primarily configured around
stealthbased forces.[34] Based on these perceptions, a failure to explore cybermaneuver as an emerging
warfighting style potentially risks setting up the Force XXI Army for a catastrophe much like that which befell
France in the spring of 1940 when it eschewed both the new German operational art which had developed and
the expanded concept of the battlefield underlying it.
Conclusion
The concepts developed in this essay represent an initial attempt to give substance to the meaning of "asymmetry"
in forceonforce relationships. It has been proposed that advanced forces gain an asymmetrical battlefield
advantage over traditional forces by means of techniques and processes such as cloaking, blending into civilian
populations, concealment, and deception-all of which allow them to avoid detection by entering a realm which is
frequently called cyberspace. At the same time, traditional forces, which remain in humanspace, are subject to
detection and attack by these nowstealthy systems. Current and emerging precision strike capabilities support
this perception. When one force can attack another force and in the process not be attacked in return, a clear
battlefield advantage exists.
Our traditional concepts of threedimensional battlespace are unable to explain such a military revolution because
increases in the physical dimensions of a battlefield cannot account for it. Rather, a new concept of range is
required, one that is defined by a "humansensing dimensional barrier" which separates humanspace from
cyberspace. Given this perceptual lens, a terrorist in civilian garb who is standing five meters from a US soldier
and whom the US soldier views as a noncombatant is at a much greater battlefield range from that soldier than a
hostile tank that is visible 1000 meters away-and yet is potentially far more dangerous to the soldier than is the
tank. To counter such forces, we will most likely be required to rely upon principles of data fusion which can
provide us with the capability to bring such cloaked entities out into the open where they can be neutralized or
destroyed. A number of implications can be derived from the development of such a technically advanced
battlespace that bear directly on the Army's conduct of war in the future:
The US Army should explore the development of cybermaneuver doctrine in support of Force XXI. It is
proposed that such doctrine could better exploit the advanced battlespace which is developing than more
traditionally based warfighting concepts such as maneuver or maneuver force protection as described in
FM 1005 and DA Pam 5255 respectively. Cybermaneuver doctrine would be a natural complement to
maturing precision strike concepts which are focused upon the neutralization or destruction of opposing
humanspaceresiding forces. Implicit in this doctrine would be the development of a capability to defeat
opposing stealthmasked forces.
Lighter forces may possess more of a defensive advantage than heavier forces because lighter forces can
more easily seek the defensive advantages that cyberspace offers. This could mean that defense would no
longer be measured by such traditional concepts as heavier armor or even speed, but rather by the ability
of a force to make itself "invisible" to detection.
A further blurring of the distinction between soldier and civilian may likely result. War in the Western
world has been conducted from the time of Frederick the Great by armies wearing distinctive uniforms
which have distinguished combatants from noncombatants and one opposing army from another. Our
modern camouflaged battledress uniforms are based upon this evolutionary pattern of uniform
development. These uniforms are not worn by many soldiers representing nonWestern cultures because
behavioral norms and ethical systems to which these soldiers subscribe allow them to discard the symbols
of the soldier in order to obtain the defensive benefits that cyberspace provides. We may expect this trend
to intensify as American dominance of the humanspace battlefield increases.
The perceptual abilities of US soldiers will likely be enhanced to provide them with "extrahumansensing
capabilities" which will allow them to peer into cyberspace for the purposes of identifying threat forces.
Two methods may be employed. The first is by technical means such as the Land Warrior program, which
provides night vision capability. The second is by better exploiting the organic capabilities of our troops by
training them to be aware of the different smells, habits, and behaviors of warriors in specific cultures or
ethnic groups with which we may find ourselves in conflict.
If our traditional concept of front lines-linearity-becomes blurred because of the effects of the
"humansensing dimensional barrier" separating cyberspace from humanspace, we may expect that the
tactical, operational, and strategic continuum as we now understand it will be reexamined and possibly
redefined. The threedimensional quality of that traditional continuum cannot be expected to define the
reality of a fourthdimensional battlespace where rear areas and flanks may no longer exist, and where
what was in earlier times known as the "Zone of the Interior" (the continental United States) is part of the
region of conflict.
Implications such as these could prove difficult for an Army victorious in the Gulf War to consider, much less
accept, because they challenge both the core of its doctrinal sensibilities and its traditional force structure
preferences. Yet the value of informed challenges was recognized by General Sullivan, writing as Chief of Staff,
along with Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles:
Ideas that have the potential to overturn longestablished, bureaucratically entrenched methods of
operation are not welcomed by the average man. When the paradigm shifts, most cannot grasp the
full potential of new ideas. New technologies and processes can frighten those who are comfortable
with the routines established to accommodate the old technologies. Furthermore, vested interests
within the organization and within its bureaucracy-usually for what to them are good and logical
reasons-will resist ideas that threaten the status quo. Bureaucracies flourish on procedures instituted
to ensure efficiency. Innovation is the enemy of efficiency because it threatens established
procedures. This is a mindset that we cannot afford in Force XXI. While military professionals must
hold the security of the nation as something with which they dare not gamble, they cannot afford to
discourage the kind of imagination and innovation that is needed to meet the varied challenges that
will arise in the 21st century.[35]
To be a relevant military force in the next century, the Army must learn to adapt itself like an entrepreneurial
organization to the social, political, economic, and military changes which are now upon us. While Army
traditions based upon individual integrity, honor, and service to country must be retained, those based on
discredited perceptions of the battlefield and of warfighting itself will be left where they belong-in the twilight of
the 20th century.
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